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NOTE
JURISDICTION OF PARDONED AND COMMUTED SENTENCES
MUST REMAIN WITHIN THE JUDICIAL BRANCH
Dalton Kane
I. INTRODUCTION
Sir William Blackstone defined the power to pardon as an act of executive
mercy.1 The power to pardon allows an Executive to eliminate a court’s
sentence of an individual. Whereas an expungement eliminates a conviction,
a pardon maintains the conviction but eliminates the sentence.2 Within the
power to pardon is the power to commute sentences.3 Rather than completely
eliminating a sentence, this power allows the President to shorten the
sentence of an individual.4 In Schick v. Reed, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
“the pardon power includes the authority to commute sentences in whole
and in part.”5 Finally, within the power to commute sentences, the President
may also put conditions on commuted sentences.6 This allows the President
to implement public policy or encourage certain behaviors by commuting a
sentence.
The power to pardon is an important tool used by the Executive Branch as
a means to enact justice within the laws of the nation. Whereas the Legislative
Branch sometimes cannot react quickly to public sentiment, the Executive
may use the power to pardon to quickly implement public sentiments toward
the law.7 Similarly, the power to pardon allows the Executive to mitigate the
harshness of the law in certain situations.8 This is important in order to
maintain public support of the judicial system.9 The power to pardon also
allows citizens an avenue for seeking justice. When it is no longer possible to
obtain justice or mercy from the courts, an individual may still turn to the
Executive Branch.

1
Dennis v. Terris, 927 F.3d 955, 957–58 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2571
(2020).
2
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST.: OFF. OF THE PARDON ATT’Y, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2020),
https://www.justice.gov/pardon/frequently-asked-questions.
3
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 260 (1974).
4
Id.
5
Dennis, 927 F.3d at 957–58 (quoting Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 260 (1974)).
6
Id. at 958.
7
See infra Section V.C.1.
8
See KATHLEEN D. MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 17 (1989).
9
Id.
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Unfortunately, a recent decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
threatens to undermine the power to pardon. In that case, the court held that
the Judicial Branch no longer has jurisdiction over the original conviction of
pardoned or commuted sentences; instead, the Executive Branch has
jurisdiction over the original conviction.10 Meanwhile, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Judicial Branch retains jurisdiction over
pardoned or commuted sentences.11 This lack of a uniform standard amongst
the courts will result in uncertainty regarding the effects of applying for and
receiving a pardoned or commuted sentence. This will result in a chilling
effect on the use and acceptance of pardons, and inmates may forfeit a
valuable means of seeking justice. Therefore, appellate courts must adopt a
uniform standard for which branch of government retains jurisdiction over
pardoned or commuted sentences.
This article argues that courts must find that the Judicial Branch retains
jurisdiction over pardoned or commuted sentences. Section I introduces the
power to pardon and the issue created by the circuit courts of appeals’
decisions. Section II explains the historical background of the power to
pardon. Section III explains the decisions by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affecting the power to
pardon. Section IV discusses the Constitution’s framework for the
distribution of power across the three different branches of government and
how the separation of powers requires the Judicial Branch to retain
jurisdiction over pardoned or commuted sentences. Section V argues that the
public policy interests supported by the power to pardon will be harmed if
the courts grant jurisdiction to the Executive Branch. Section VI contains the
conclusion.
II. A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE POWER TO PARDON
The power to pardon has been a vital tool for chief executives to
implement policies and counter some of the more severe effects of a nation’s
laws and judicial sentencings. This power has existed since the beginning of
time, from ancient empires to its development in English common law.12 The
pardoning power was adopted in the U.S. Constitution, and it has played an
important role in the development of America throughout its history.

10
11
12

United States v. Surratt, 855 F.3d 218, 219–20 (4th Cir. 2017) (mem.).
Dennis v. Terris, 927 F.3d 955, 958 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2571 (2020).
MOORE, supra note 8, at 15-17.
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The Power to Pardon in the Ancient World

The power to pardon is a fundamental concept of punishment that goes
back to the beginning of time.13 Indeed, perhaps the first pardon was God’s
commuting of Adam and Eve’s sentence for eating from the tree of the
knowledge of good and evil.14 Although God told Adam and Eve that they
would “surely die” if they ate from the tree, He instead allowed them to live
under a curse.15 God also commuted Cain’s sentence after he killed his
brother Abel; rather than condemn Cain to death, God allowed him to roam
the Earth under a curse.16
Although Hammurabi’s Code was known for its somewhat brutal
punishments, it also had many instances in which an individual could be
pardoned.17 For example, Article 129 allowed adulterers to be pardoned
under certain circumstances.18 In the Old Testament, the Israelites
understood that both God and their leaders had the power to pardon.19 For
example, Joshua extended a conditional pardon to Rahab and her family
because she helped the Israelite spies—as long as she kept the presence of the
spies a secret, tied a scarlet cord to her window, and remained in her house,
she would be spared.20
In Ancient Greece, the power to pardon was decided democratically.21 In
order to obtain a pardon, a person needed to obtain 6,000 signatures of Greek
citizens in support of his petition.22 Because of this stringent requirement,
Greek celebrities were often the only individuals with the ability to obtain
pardons.23 The Romans had a complicated system for obtaining a pardon—
“legislative and judicial, full and partial, pardon by the will of the
Emperor . . . .”24 Marcus Junius Brutus was captured by Julius Caesar when

13

Id.
Genesis 2:17; Genesis 3:16–19.
15
Genesis 3:16–19.
16
Genesis 4:10–12; KATHLEEN D. MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 16 (1989).
17
MOORE, supra note 8, at 15.
18
Id.
19
See Exodus 23:21; Numbers 14:19.
20
Joshua 2:17–22.
21
JEFFREY CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER 10 (2009).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
MOORE, supra note 8, at 16.
14
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the Romans defeated Pompey.25 Caesar pardoned Brutus and allowed him to
rise in the ranks of the Roman government; however, after Caesar declared
himself dictator, Brutus participated in the plot to assassinate Caesar.26
Pontius Pilate also exhibited the Roman power to pardon in allowing the
people to choose to pardon either Barabbas or Jesus.27 The people chose
Barabbas, and God offered the ultimate pardon to all mankind through the
death of Jesus—a pardon for sins.28
B.

The Power to Pardon in English Common Law

Under the English common law, the power to pardon was an important
means to soften the harshness of the system of punishment.29 For example,
the punishment for a felony was the death penalty; however, of the 1,254
individuals sentenced to death in 1818, the staggering amount of 1,157 of
those people were pardoned by the king.30 This not only provided justice for
specific English subjects charged with crimes, but it also instilled confidence
in the system of punishment employed by the crown. Subjects knew that they
could appeal to the crown as a potential means of justice.
The power to pardon originated as an absolute power of the king.31 While
this brought benefits to English subjects, the unlimited power also caused
corruption and abuse by the crown.32 For example, some pardons were
offered in exchange for money granted to the crown.33 Further, it was
common during a war to issue a pardon to all those that were convicted of
homicide if a person volunteered to fight for a certain amount of time.34 After
the impeachment of Lord Danby, a prominent politician during the reign of
King Charles II,35 the power was gradually restricted in order to avoid its
abuse.36 For example, “[p]arliament restricted the power to grant a pardon to

25
E. Badian, Marcus Junius Brutus, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 8, 2019),
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Marcus-Junius-Brutus.
26
Id.
27
Matthew 27:17.
28
Id. at 27:21; Romans 6:23.
29
MOORE, supra note 8, at 17.
30
Id. at 17–18.
31
William F. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 475, 478, 487 (1977).
32
Id. at 483–84.
33
Id. at 478.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 487–92.
36
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 260 (1972); Duker, supra note 31, at 495–96.
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one who transported a prisoner overseas to evade the Habeas Corpus Act,
because to allow such pardons would drain the Great Writ of its vitality.”37
Some of the most well-known English political thinkers contributed to the
discussion on the power to pardon. John Locke argued that the power of
pardon was an important way for the Executive to help mitigate the severe
consequences of the law.38 Montesquieu argued that, while monarchies may
benefit from the use of clemency, the power to pardon was not necessary for
a republic.39 Sir William Blackstone also believed that the pardon power was
acceptable for monarchies and unacceptable in democracies.40 American
scholars have vehemently countered these assertions and defended the power
to pardon in the new Republic.41 The scope of the power to pardon was hotly
contested between the King and Parliament throughout English history, and
this debate eventually made its way to the New World.
C.

The Power to Pardon during the Founding of The United States of
America

The English common law power to pardon was carried over from England
into the American colonies. In the colony of Plymouth, a colonist named
Lyford was convicted and sentenced to banishment from the colony;
however, he was given six months to make arrangements, and many colonists
intended to release him if he repented of his actions.42 After changing his
behavior and repenting in front of the colonists, he was allowed to enter back
into society and teach.43 The power to pardon also greatly affected the colony
of Jamestown. In one of the most famous stories of American history, Chief
Powhatan pardoned Captain John Smith from a death sentence at the request
of Pocahontas.44 As a result of this act of mercy, Smith later pardoned and
released several of Powhatan’s warriors that attacked Jamestown—this repaid
Pocahontas for saving his life.45 As more colonies were established in the New
World, the King vested the English governing authorities with the power to

37

Schick, 419 U.S. at 260.
CROUCH, supra note 21, at 13.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
WILLIAM BRADFORD, BRADFORD’S HISTORY OF PLIMOTH PLANTATION 219–20 (1898),
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/24950/24950-h/24950-h.htm#Page_219.
43
Id.
44
DAVID A. PRICE, LOVE & HATE IN JAMESTOWN: JOHN SMITH, POCAHONTAS, AND THE
START OF A NEW NATION 68 (Vintage Books ed., 2005) (2003).
45
Id. at 83.
38
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pardon.46 Many of the colonies eventually bestowed the royal governors with
the full power to pardon, and there were few limits placed on this power.47
After the Revolutionary War, Americans were skeptical of the powers of a
large national government, and the power to pardon was weakened.48 There
was no power to pardon on a national scale, and many states limited the
power as well.49 For example, Georgia did not allow the executive to issue any
pardons.50 However, the system of government which the colonies had
formed under the Articles of Confederation was failing, and delegates were
sent from the colonies to fix it.51 The delegates to the Constitutional
Convention debated many aspects of executive power, including the power
to pardon.52 This debate helped shape how the power to pardon was written
into the Constitution; as a result, the founders added an important tool to the
Executive Branch.
The power to pardon, as stated in the U.S. Constitution, was based upon
the pardoning power from English common law.53 Indeed, Chief Justice John
Marshall, when analyzing the power to pardon, said the Court should look to
English laws in order to understand how this power functions.54 There was
very little debate in the Constitutional Convention with respect to the power
to pardon; the only disagreement seemed to be over whether the President
could pardon those convicted of treason.55 James Madison and Gouverneur
Morris believed there should be no power to pardon traitors, and Wilson
believed the power should extend to those convicted of treason.56 Ultimately,
the delegates allowed the President to pardon treasonable offenses.57
In Article II, Section II, clause 1, the United States Constitution states that
the President “shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences
against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.”58 Alexander
Hamilton, in an attempt to assure the people that the President of the new
Republic would not have too much power, stated that the power to pardon
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

CROUCH, supra note 21, at 12.
Duker, supra note 31, at 498–500.
See id.
Id. at 500.
Id.
Id. at 501.
Id.
Dennis v. Terris, 927 F.3d 955, 957 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2571 (2020).
United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160 (1833).
DAVID B. ROBERTSON, THE ORIGINAL COMPROMISE 145 (2013).
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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did not extend to impeachment—the Legislature could still check the
President’s power.59 Moreover, Hamilton also argued that a well-timed
pardon could help to restore the tranquility of the nation.60
D.

The Power to Pardon From the Adoption of the U.S. Constitution to
Modern Times

Since the ratification of the Constitution, presidents of the United States
have issued several famous pardons. George Washington famously pardoned
those who participated in the Whiskey Rebellion.61 After the Civil War
ravaged the nation, President Andrew Johnson granted a pardon to many
former Confederates if they would swear allegiance to the United States.62
Both of these instances of clemency were used to help bring the nation
together after times of turmoil, just as Hamilton predicted in his argument
in support of the pardon in The Federalist.63
President Ford pardoned Richard Nixon after the Watergate scandal.64
When President Ford’s pardon was challenged, the court stated that it was
understandable that Ford would need to pardon Nixon in order to bring the
nation together during such tumultuous times.65 Modern presidents have
continued to use the pardon as a tool for achieving peace, justice, and political
goals. For example, Jimmy Carter issued a pardon to those who dodged the
draft during Vietnam.66 President Trump pardoned Sheriff Joe Arpaio, an
Arizona sheriff who supported furthering Trump’s immigration policy
during his campaign.67 President Trump also commuted the sentence of Alice
59

THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
61
George Washington, Proclamation of Pardons in Western Pennsylvania (July 10, 1795)
(transcript available in The Univ. of Virginia Miller Center, https://millercenter.org/thepresidency/presidential-speeches/july-10-1795-proclamation-pardons-westernpennsylvania).
62
Andrew Johnson, Proclamation Pardoning Persons Who Participated in the Rebellion
(May 29, 1865) (transcript available in The Univ. of Virginia Miller Center,
https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/may-29-1865-proclamationpardoning-persons-who-participated).
63
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
64
Murphy v. Ford, 390 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
65
Id. at 1374.
66
The Learning Network, Sept. 16, 1974: The Conditional Amnesty for Vietnam Draft
Dodgers and Military Deserters, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2011, 4:23 AM),
https://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/sept-16-1974-conditional-amnesty-forvietnam-draft-dodgers-and-military-deserters/.
67
See Kevin Liptak, Daniella Diaz & Sophie Tatum, Trump Pardons Former Sheriff Joe
Arpaio, CNN (Aug. 27, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/25/politics/sheriff-joe-arpaio60
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Johnson as a way to counter the public policy of implementing more
stringent sentences for minor drug offenses.68
E.

Challenges to the Power to Pardon

There have been several challenges to the power to pardon that have been
resolved by the Supreme Court. The Court settled the issue of whether an
individual had to accept a pardon for it to be effective.69 In a case where an
individual would not accept a pardon, Chief Justice John Marshall held that
a pardon is only effective if it is accepted by the individual.70 When it is not
accepted, the Court is to ignore the pardon and issue the sentence.71
After the pardoning of President Nixon, President Ford’s power to pardon
Nixon was challenged because Nixon had not been formally charged.72 The
court held that the power to pardon does not extend to impeachments and
the House of Representatives could still impeach Nixon.73 The Court also said
that it was understandable that Ford would need to pardon Nixon in order
to reassure the nation during the tumultuous times after Watergate.74
Therefore, the President has the power to pardon an individual before the
individual has been formally charged with anything.75
In Schick v. Reed, a master sergeant in the army was sentenced to death for
killing an eight-year-old girl.76 Although Schick confessed to the murder, he
argued that he was insane at the time.77 On March 25, 1960, President
Eisenhower commuted Schick’s sentence from the death penalty to life
imprisonment on the condition that he would never be eligible for parole.78
In 1971, Schick filed suit to require the United States Board of Parole to
donald-trump-pardon/index.html. See also United States v. Arpaio, No. CR-16-01012-001PHX-SRB, 2017 WL 4839072, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 19, 2017) (The court found that Arpaio’s
pardon meant that he will not face punishment; however, his conviction is still on the record.
The court states that the pardon does not erase historical facts, but rather shows executive
mercy with regard to the punishment.).
68
Jeremy Diamond & Kaitlan Collins, Trump Commutes Sentence of Alice Marie Johnson,
CNN (June 6, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/06/politics/alice-marie-johnsoncommuted-sentence/index.html.
69
United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 161(1833).
70
Id. at 161–62.
71
Id.
72
Murphy v. Ford, 390 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D. Mich. 1975).
73
Id. at 1373.
74
Id. at 1374.
75
Id.
76
Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 257 (1974).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 258.
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consider him for parole.79 He made two arguments. First, Schick challenged
the validity of the conditional commutation of his sentence.80 Second, Schick
argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia, which found
the death penalty to be unconstitutional, required that he be resentenced to
a simple life term with no conditions attached.81 After explaining the history
of the President’s power to pardon and commute sentences, the Supreme
Court held that the President has the power to attach conditions to the
commutation of sentences.82 The Court also found that, had President
Eisenhower not pardoned Schick, he most likely would have been killed prior
to the Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia.83 Therefore, Schick could not
argue that he was given an “unfair bargain” with the conditional commuting
of his sentence, and that he should be resentenced based on how individuals
with pending cases were treated when Furman v. Georgia was decided.84 This
case was monumental in reaffirming the President’s power to issue
conditional commutations.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT BETWEEN THE FOURTH AND SIXTH CIRCUIT COURTS
OF APPEALS
The Fourth and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals have split over
jurisdictional questions regarding the power to pardon. These courts disagree
on whether the Judiciary retains jurisdiction over the original conviction of
an individual after that person has received a pardoned or commuted
sentence. This question is important in preserving the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution and protecting the Executive Branch’s power
to pardon. This Article will explain both Circuit decisions and argue how
public policy supports finding that the Judiciary should retain jurisdiction
over the original conviction of pardoned or commuted sentences.
A.

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

In Dennis v. Terris, Quincy Dennis was convicted of committing several
drug offenses and sentenced to life in prison.85 Dennis was convicted of
committing three crimes: “attempting to distribute cocaine base, possessing
cocaine base with intent to distribute it, and possessing cocaine with intent

79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id.
Id. at 258–59.
Id. at 259.
Schick, 419 U.S. at 267.
Id. at 268.
Id.
Dennis v. Terris, 927 F.3d 955, 957 (6th Cir. 2019).
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to distribute it.”86 Dennis’s conviction resulted in a mandatory life prison
sentence; however, President Obama commuted Dennis’s sentence to thirty
years in prison.87 Dennis filed a habeas petition and argued that he should
have only been subject to a mandatory prison sentence of twenty years.88
Dennis believed that one of his charges did not count as a felony under
recidivism enhancement.89
The district court found that Dennis’s petition was moot for two reasons.90
First, the court had no authority to alter a commuted sentence.91 Second,
Dennis was no longer serving the original judicial sentence; rather, he was
serving a commuted executive sentence.92 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
explained that the “issue is the interaction of an executive branch
power . . . with a limitation on a judicial power (to resolve only live cases or
controversies).”93
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals first looked at the history of the power
to pardon in America.94 It quoted the President’s power to pardon as stated
in Article II of the Constitution and stated that the founding fathers based
the power to pardon off of the power held by the English crown.95 Because of
this, the President can also commute sentences, and there are very few limits
on the President’s power to pardon.96 The court then quoted Article III of the
Constitution to show that the judicial power of the United States is vested in
the Supreme Court and inferior courts created by Congress.97 However, the
court explained that, “[c]ourts may resolve only ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’”98
The court held that Dennis’s petition was not moot.99 Individuals who
receive a commuted sentence are still bound by a judicial sentence, and the
commutation only affects how the sentence is carried out.100 The Judicial
Branch renders judgment while the Executive Branch effectuates the
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Terris, 927 F.3d at 957.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 957–58.
Terris, 927 F.3d at 958.
Id.
Id. at 959.
Id. at 958.
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judgment.101 The court also explained that the existence of conditional
commutations further supports the holding that courts retain jurisdiction
over original sentences.102 For example, if a prisoner fails to abide by the
condition placed on a commuted sentence, the original sentence is
reinstated.103 Moreover, because unconditional commutations do not require
the recipient’s consent, removing the court’s jurisdiction over the original
sentence could allow the President to strategically prohibit certain people
from seeking justice through an unconditional commutation.104
The court then distinguished Dennis’s petition from that in Schick v. Reed,
419 U.S. 256 (1974).105 While Schick challenged the condition put on the
commutation, Dennis challenged the original sentence.106 Further, Dennis
agreed to the conditional commutation of his sentence; however, he did not
agree to forgo any potential challenge to the original conviction.107 The court
then recognized that its decision was in tension with the Fourth Circuit.108
The court stated that it did not understand the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in
finding an appeal by a petitioner in a similar situation to be moot; therefore,
the Sixth Circuit held that Dennis’s petition was not moot.109 However, the
court then denied Dennis’s petition on the merits.110
B.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

In United States v. Surratt, Surratt was given a mandatory life
sentence based on the court’s interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1).111
Surratt argued his life sentence was “a fundamental defect of constitutional
dimension . . . .”112 The government agreed with Surratt’s argument that he
was incorrectly sentenced, but the court assigned independent counsel to
argue that Surratt’s life sentence was correct.113 While this was ongoing, the
President commuted Surratt’s sentence to a 200-month term of

101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id.
Id.
Terris, 927 F.3d at 958.
Id. at 958–59.
Id. at 959–60.
Id. at 960.
Id.
Id.
Terris, 927 F.3d at 960–61.
Id. at 961.
United States v. Surratt, 855 F.3d 218, 220 (4th Cir. 2017) (Wynn, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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imprisonment.114 Therefore, because of the commutation of his sentence, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Surratt’s appeal as moot.115 While
the court only issued an order, Judge Wilkinson concurred and wrote an
opinion that grants insight into the logic behind the court’s decision.116 Judge
Wynn dissented and wrote an opinion with many of the same arguments as
those used by the court in Dennis v. Terris.117
1.

Judge Wilkinson’s Concurrence

Judge Wilkinson concurred with the Fourth Circuit’s order.118 He argued
that Surratt had already received more than the relief he requested.119 Because
the President commuted Surratt’s sentence, Judge Wilkinson argued Surratt
was no longer serving a sentence imposed by the Judiciary; rather, he was
serving a presidentially-commuted sentence.120 The Judiciary cannot
interfere with a commuted sentence by the Executive Branch, and Surratt
should not be allowed to receive all of the benefits of the commuted sentence
without accepting the burdens as well.121 Finally, Judge Wilkinson argued the
dissenting opinion would violate the principle of finality, as judgments would
no longer be final.122
2.

Judge Wynn’s Dissent

Judge Wynn argued that the case was not moot because the dismissal of
the case meant that Surratt would have to spend several more years in
prison.123 This meant that the decision by the court would have determined
whether Surratt would be released from prison.124 Therefore, Surratt had a
“concrete interest” in his case and its potential resolution.125 To further
support his argument, Judge Wynn cited Simpson v. Battaglia.126 In that case,

114

Id. at 224.
Id. at 219 (majority).
116
Id. at 219–20 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
117
Compare Terris, 927 F.3d at 958-60, with Surratt, 855 F.3d at 221–31 (Wynn, J.,
dissenting.)
118
Surratt, 855 F.3d at 219-20 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
119
Id. at 219.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 219–20.
122
Id. at 220.
123
Id. at 221 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
124
Surratt, 855 F.3d at 221 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
125
Id.
126
Id. at 226 (citing Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 585, 595 (7th Cir. 2006)).
115
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Simpson was sentenced to death by the Illinois Supreme Court.127 After filing
a habeas petition, the Governor of Illinois commuted Simpson’s sentence
from death to life imprisonment.128 Although the State argued that Simpson’s
habeas petition was moot due to his commuted sentence, the Seventh Circuit
held the petition was not moot because, if granted, Simpson would face only
a minimum of 20 years imprisonment as opposed to life in prison.129 This
meant that Simpson could still obtain relief and the petition was not moot.130
Much like Simpson, Judge Wynn argued that Surratt’s case was not moot
because he had a concrete interest in obtaining freedom through less time in
prison.131
Next, Judge Wynn addressed each of the State’s four arguments in support
of finding Surratt’s case moot. First, the State argued that Surratt, after he
accepted the commuted sentence, was serving an executive sentence rather
than a judicially-imposed sentence.132 The Supreme Court held that the
President has the power to pardon and to attach conditions to a pardon or
commutation; however, there are still some limits to the power to pardon.133
For example, the President cannot engage in invidious discrimination or
violate separation-of-powers principles when attaching conditions to a
commutation.134 Therefore, Judge Wynn argued that the Judiciary still retains
jurisdiction over pardoned or commuted sentences in order to ensure that a
President’s condition does not violate the law.135 Further, an individual who
receives a commuted sentence is still subject to the disabling consequences of
receiving the underlying conviction.136 This means that the courts should still
be able to review the original conviction in order to grant relief.
Second, the State argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Schick
required the court to dismiss Surratt’s case.137 However, Judge Wynn argued
that Schick was distinguishable from Surratt’s case.138 First, the military
proceedings in Schick were different from the constitutional proceedings

127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

People v. Simpson, 665 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (Ill. 1996).
Surratt, 855 F.3d at 226 (citing Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d at 595).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 227.
Id.
Surratt, 855 F.3d at 227–28.
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id.

196

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:1

involved in Surratt’s case.139 Second, Schick filed his habeas petition ten years
after President Eisenhower commuted his sentence; however, Surratt filed his
petition years before President Obama commuted his sentence.140 Finally,
while Schick was not serving a death penalty sentence when the Supreme
Court found the death penalty unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia, Surratt
was serving a mandatory life sentence when the law changed regarding his
conviction.141 Because these distinctions were very important to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Schick, Judge Wynn believed that the holding, in that case,
was distinguishable.142
Third, the State argued that Surratt was serving a different sentence—his
original conviction and judicially imposed sentence was replaced by an
executively imposed sentence.143 Judge Wynn argued a commuted sentence
is still the same sentence imposed by the court; rather, the Executive has
simply chosen to shorten the sentence.144 Moreover, Surratt should still be
able to obtain relief for his original conviction through the courts.145 Finally,
Judge Wynn argued that, if a condition set by the Executive for a conditional
commutation is broken, the prisoner is once again subject to the original
sentencing; therefore, the original sentence was never “replaced.”146
Therefore, Judge Wynn argued Surratt should still be able to appeal to the
courts for relief from his original conviction.
Finally, the State argued that Surratt waived his right to challenge the
original conviction by accepting the commuted sentence.147 Judge Wynn
stated that conditional commutations are viewed as contracts between the
Executive and the inmate.148 Comparing the acceptance of conditional
commutations with the acceptance of plea deals, Judge Wynn pointed out
that the Supreme Court disfavors inferring a waiver of rights in plea deals.149
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The Supreme Court disfavors inferring that inmates intended to waive their
rights through a plea deal; the waiver of rights should be voluntarily and
knowingly made to be valid.150 Here, Judge Wynn similarly argues that the
court should not infer that Surratt’s acceptance of the conditional
commutation meant that he intended to waive his right to challenge his
original conviction.151
IV. THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION SUPPORTS FINDING THAT THE
JUDICIAL BRANCH RETAINS JURISDICTION OVER PARDONED AND
COMMUTED SENTENCES
The Sixth Circuit and Judge Wynn of the Fourth Circuit are correct in
finding that courts retain jurisdiction over the original conviction and
sentencing of a pardoned individual. The nature of the Constitution and its
vesting of the executive and judicial powers in their respective branches
supports this assertion. The Constitution implements the separation of
powers in order to prevent one branch from becoming too powerful.152 A
finding by the courts that the Judicial Branch no longer retains jurisdiction
over pardoned or commuted sentences would violate the separation of
powers doctrine. This article outlines the constitutional arguments which
support this conclusion below.
A.

The Vesting of the Executive and Judicial Powers in Their Respective
Branches Requires Courts to Retain Jurisdiction Over Pardoned or
Commuted Sentences

The Constitution sets out both the executive and judicial powers and
assigns them to their respective branches.153 In Article II, the Constitution
vests the executive power in the President and the Executive Branch.154 The
Constitution does not define the term “executive power;” however, history
and precedent help to define this term. There are three characteristics of
executive power. First, the executive power, in its most basic form, is the
power to enforce the laws.155 This means that the President cannot create or
change the laws—he may only enforce the laws that have been passed by
150
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Congress.156 Second, the executive power is initiative in nature.157 This means
that the President does not have to wait for circumstances to occur to respond
with power; he may exert power at will.158 Third, the Executive has some
discretion in enforcing the laws.159 For example, the Executive may prioritize
certain policy goals or push Congress to focus on different issues.
In contrast, Article III of the Constitution vests the judicial power in the
Supreme Court and inferior courts created by Congress.160 The Constitution
also does not define the term “judicial power;” however, history and
precedent can help define what this term means. First, judicial power is a
responsive power.161 This means that the courts must respond to the laws
already passed—the courts cannot create the law.162 Second, the judicial
power is limited only to the parties in the case before the court.163 Whereas
laws passed by Congress and signed by the President affect all people within
the nation, a decision by a court only binds the specific parties in that case.
Third, the judicial power must be based on judgment rather than will.164 The
court cannot simply implement its will; the holdings of the court must be
based on the application of the law to given facts. These characteristics
distinguish the judicial power from the executive and legislative powers, and
the separation of these powers into different branches is vitally important in
preventing one branch of government from holding too much power.
This analysis of the executive and judicial power can be applied to a
conviction and sentencing by a court. When a court convicts an individual
and issues a sentence, the court is exercising its judicial power. It is making a
decision based on the application of the law to the facts, which is then binding
on the parties of that particular case. However, the court then does not have
the power to carry out the sentence because the judicial power does not
include the power to enforce the law—this ability is reserved to the Executive
Branch.165 Therefore, the Executive Branch carries out and enforces the
sentence.
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One way in which the President may choose to enforce a conviction and
sentence is to issue a pardon or commute the person’s sentence.166 The power
to pardon is one tool the President may use in determining how to best
enforce the laws. If the President feels that a law or conviction is unjust, the
founders granted the President the power to pardon or commute the
sentence.167 Not only does the power to pardon reinforce the idea that the
Executive Branch is vested with the executive power, but it also provides a
check on the Judicial Branch. The founders were very concerned one branch
of government might become too powerful; the ability of the President to
pardon a conviction allows one branch to override the decision of another
branch. Therefore, the Constitution grants the Executive discretion in how
to enforce a sentence by the Judiciary. The Executive may pardon an
individual or commute that individual’s sentence when deciding how to best
enforce a court’s holding.168
Based on this analysis, the courts must retain jurisdiction over the original
conviction of a pardoned or commuted sentence. Judge Wynn is correct in
that it is inaccurate to state that a commuted sentence “replaces” a judicially
imposed sentence.169 Based on the paradigm enacted by the Constitution, the
Executive is merely enforcing the judicially-imposed sentence. While the
Executive is choosing how to best carry out the sentence, the Judicial Branch
is charged with applying the law to the facts before it and deciding the
conviction and sentence. This power does not change when an executive
decides to use the power to pardon or commute a sentence— the Judiciary
retains jurisdiction over the original conviction and original sentencing.
Therefore, courts must find that the Judicial Branch has the power to review
the original convictions of pardoned or commuted sentences.
In addition, the issue of the President being able to pardon himself further
illustrates that the Executive Branch does not have jurisdiction over the
original conviction of a pardoned or commuted sentence. During the
Constitutional Convention, many of the delegates feared the President would
be able to pardon himself from high crimes; in fact, it was debated whether
the power to pardon should extend to instances of treason.170 However, if the
President commits treason, he cannot pardon himself—he is still subject to
166
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the authority of the Legislature, and it may impeach him if it desires.171
Therefore, the Legislature may still impeach and remove the President from
power, even if he has pardoned himself. By analogy, the Executive’s issuing
of a pardon or commuted sentence is not the final word for a defendant’s
sentence. The original conviction is still subject to the authority of the
Judicial Branch, and it could overturn a challenged conviction—even if the
Executive has issued a pardon or commuted the sentence.
Finally, the nature of the pardon as implemented by the Constitution
requires that the Judicial Branch must retain jurisdiction over pardoned or
commuted sentences because a pardon does not eliminate the original
conviction. If the delegates to the Constitutional Convention wanted the
Executive Branch to obtain jurisdiction over the conviction of pardoned
sentences, they could have easily allowed a pardon to eliminate the original
conviction. However, a pardon only eliminates the sentence—the conviction
still stands.172 It would be illogical for a pardoned individual to then have to
appeal to the Executive again to have the original conviction overturned.
Instead, because the conviction still stands even after the pardon, the
individual must seek justice through the Judiciary regarding the original
conviction. A conviction can be overturned by an expungement; however,
this is also under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Branch which further shows
that the Judicial Branch retains jurisdiction over pardoned or commuted
sentences.173
V. PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS THE JUDICIARY RETAINING JURISDICTION OVER
THE CONVICTION OF PARDONED AND COMMUTED SENTENCES
The power to pardon is an extremely important tool of the Executive
Branch. Historically it has been a means for the Executive to counteract the
harshness of the law and promote trust in the system of government.174 The
power to pardon has created several public policy interests that will be
harmed if the power to pardon is weakened. As outlined below, a finding by
the courts that the Judicial Branch does not have jurisdiction over the
conviction of pardoned or commuted sentences will weaken the power to
pardon and inhibit several public policy interests. Therefore, courts must find
the Judicial Branch still maintains jurisdiction over pardoned and commuted
sentences.
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Petitioners Still Need the Judiciary as a Means of Justice

The courts must hold that the Judiciary still retains jurisdiction over a
commuted or pardoned sentence in order to ensure a petitioner still has a
valid means of obtaining justice. Based on the decision by the Fourth Circuit,
Surratt has no valid avenue to pursue justice for his case.175 While it is true
that he could still appeal again to the Executive, obtaining a pardon from an
executive is an extremely rare grant of clemency.176 This not only would exert
more of a burden on the Executive Branch, but it also would make it much
less likely that a wronged individual would receive justice. The courts were
established so that individuals could seek justice and have the law applied to
certain circumstances. However, if the courts determine that they no longer
have jurisdiction over pardoned or commuted sentences, then this avenue is
no longer open. Because it would be very rare that the Executive would again
act with respect to a pardon, individuals who have accepted a pardoned or
commuted sentence would be left with practically no options for seeking
redress for their original conviction and sentencing. This would prohibit part
of the population from seeking justice.
B.

Conditional Commuted Sentences Show that the Executive Intends for
the Judicial Branch to Retain Jurisdiction over the Original
Conviction.

In Schick v. Reed, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the fact that the power to
pardon includes the power to enact conditional commuted sentences.177 A
conditional commuted sentence is a sentence that has been shortened as long
as the individual fulfills some conditions put in place by the Executive. For
example, sometimes individuals convicted for drug offenses are granted
commuted sentences conditioned on good behavior in prison or enrollment
in certain skill development programs. Conditional commuted sentences
allow the Executive to encourage certain behaviors and policy goals. For
example, if the President believes that the sentences for drug offenses are
generally too harsh, he may grant a commuted sentence that is conditioned
on the enrollment in career development programs at the prison. This
conditional commuted sentence allows the President to both support his
policy agenda against harsh drug laws while also increasing the probability
that the individual involved will be a working member of the community.
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However, if the courts find that the Judicial Branch no longer has
jurisdiction over pardoned or commuted sentences, conditional commuted
sentences will no longer be given effect. If a prisoner that has been issued a
conditional commuted sentence violates the condition, the Executive would
have to re-evaluate the conviction and reinstitute a new sentence. Because the
prior conviction and sentence would be “replaced” by the conditional
commutation in this circumstance, the Executive Branch would have to
usurp the judicial power in order to determine a conviction and sentence. For
example, suppose the governor of a state commutes a prisoner’s sentence
from twenty years to ten years on the condition of good behavior. Three years
later, the prisoner gets into a fight. If the Judicial Branch no longer has
jurisdiction over the original conviction, the governor and that state’s
executive branch must establish a new conviction and sentence because the
original sentence was replaced by the commuted sentence.
On the other hand, if the Judicial Branch still retains jurisdiction over the
original sentence and conviction, the courts would only have to reinstate the
original sentence and conviction prior to the issuing of the conditional
commutation. This accomplishes the very goal of conditional
commutations—to encourage certain behaviors by placing conditions on the
commutation of prison sentences. The condition encourages certain
behaviors, and this is accomplished through a valid threat to reinstate the
original conviction. Therefore, the existence of conditional commutations
shows that the Judicial Branch must retain jurisdiction over the original
conviction and sentencing of individuals.
C.

Taking Commuted or Pardoned Sentences Out of the Jurisdiction of
the Judicial Branch Will Result in Injustice to Individuals the Public
Interest Seeks to Protect.

As previously mentioned, the removal of the original conviction and
sentencing from the jurisdiction of the Judicial Branch will result in the loss
of an avenue of seeking justice. Individuals will no longer be able to look to
the courts to enact justice in their circumstances. For example, the most
common reason for a governor’s decision to commute a sentence from the
death penalty to life imprisonment is doubt about the inmate’s guilt.178 If
there are doubts about the inmate’s guilt, even if the inmate receives a
commuted sentence from the death penalty to life imprisonment, there is a
strong possibility that the inmate will want to challenge her original
conviction with respect to those doubts of guilt. Therefore, it does not make
178
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sense to permanently prohibit inmates from challenging their original
convictions in court by removing these cases from the jurisdiction of the
Judicial Branch. This will result either in discouraging Executives from
commuting the sentences of inmates with questionable guilt or robbing
inmates of a potential avenue of justice.
Current public policy goals make it even more evident that finding the
Judicial Branch does not retain jurisdiction over pardoned or commuted
sentences will result in injustice. First, public policy in many states is turning
away from the “three strikes rule” for non-violent drug offenders.179 Second,
the development of new technology has resulted in the overturning and
pardoning of some individuals on death row.180 Both of these policy concerns
should be considered when determining whether the Judicial Branch should
retain jurisdiction over the original conviction and sentencing of pardoned
or commuted sentences.
1.

Convictions for Non-Violent Drug Offenses

During the time of the “War on Drugs” and due to the American public’s
general wish to curtail drug use, many politicians both campaigned on and
enacted laws that imposed more harsh sentences for non-violent drug use.181
One of the most well-known examples of this is the “three strikes law” in
which an individual who is convicted for three different non-violent drug
offenses is sentenced to life in prison.182 This law led to the filling of prisons
with non-violent drug offenders while many of these individuals serving life
sentences were viewed as not being a threat to society.183 Public opinion has
since turned, and is continuing to turn, against these laws, and many
individuals want Congress to repeal these laws. Congress is slowly addressing
these issues, but there is still much work to be done.184 Presidents and many
state governors have reacted to the public by pardoning individuals convicted
179
See Kahryn Riley, Criminal Justice Reforms Are Next Big Measure of State Success, HILL
(Apr. 6, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/437080-criminal-justicereforms-are-next-big-measure-of-state-success.
180
American Civil Liberties Union, DNA Testing and the Death Penalty, ACLU.ORG (last
visited October 30, 2020) https://www.aclu.org/other/dna-testing-and-death-penalty.
181
See Arit John, A Timeline of the Rise and Fall of ‘Tough on Crime’ Drug Sentencing,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/04/a-timelineof-the-rise-and-fall-of-tough-on-crime-drug-sentencing/360983/.
182
18 U.S.C. § 3559(c).
183
See Riley, supra note 179.
184
115 CONG. REC. H10271 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2018) (statement of Rep. Grassley) (This is
a statement given by Senator Chuck Grassley on the floor of the Senate that shows that, while
Congress is making some progress on sentencing reform, there is still much work to be
done.).

204

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:1

under the “three strikes rule.”185 As a result, there are a great number of nonviolent drug offenders that have either been pardoned or are serving
conditional commuted sentences.
These circumstances are similar to circumstances in early Britain where
the laws and sentences for felonies were thought to be too severe.186 The
pardon was viewed as a way to enact justice and mercy when such harsh rules
were in place,187 and the courts should see the pardon as a way to enact justice
and mercy in the face of harsh laws imposed on non-violent drug offenders.
Congress is designed to move very slowly; however, the Executive can act
much quicker in issuing pardons to accomplish policy goals.
A finding by the courts that the Judiciary no longer has jurisdiction over
the original sentence and conviction of a pardoned or commuted sentence
thwarts this policy agenda. The Executive will be more hesitant to use the
power to pardon if he or she knows that the Executive will then have to
monitor the prisoner and potentially redecide a conviction and sentence.
Moreover, those that have been granted pardons or commuted sentences will
have to petition the Executive again for a change in conviction or sentence.
This would result in the Executive processing fewer pardon requests and
granting less pardons.
2.

Convictions for Those on Death Row

New developments in technology have cast doubt on many convictions of
death-row inmates.188 This is especially true of DNA technology and testing;
what might have appeared a closed case thirty years ago may now be in doubt.
In fact, some convictions have been overturned after applying new DNA
technology to a case.189 The power to pardon can be an important tool as
courts wrestle with how to apply this new technology to death-row cases.
Executives can commute a prisoner’s sentence from the death penalty to life
in prison if it appears that his guilt is in question. This would spare the
prisoner’s life, if the execution date is fast approaching, and allow the courts
time to determine if DNA, or other new technology, exonerates the prisoner.
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However, the recent decision by the Fourth Circuit threatens to
undermine this potential path of justice. If courts hold that the Judicial
Branch no longer has jurisdiction over the original conviction and sentencing
of commuted sentences, death row inmates would be forced to accept a
commuted sentence and forego the possibility of innocence. For example,
suppose an inmate is scheduled to be executed in one week. Many individuals
have protested his innocence, and recent developments involving DNA in
the case have cast doubt on his guilt. The governor commutes the prisoner’s
sentence from the death penalty to a life sentence in order to avoid the
execution. If the DNA evidence later appears to exonerate the prisoner, he
would no longer be able to appeal to the courts to overturn his conviction
under the Fourth Circuit’s logic. His appeal would be held moot because of
the commutation, and the courts would rule that they no longer have
jurisdiction over the commuted sentence. This would result in injustice
because the prisoner would no longer be able to overturn his conviction.
D.

Removing Commuted or Pardoned Sentences from the Jurisdiction of
the Judicial Branch Will Discourage Individuals from Seeking Pardons

Further, if courts do not allow the Judiciary to be a means of justice, those
convicted will be disincentivized from accepting a pardon or commuted
sentence. In order for a pardon or commuted sentence to be valid, it must be
accepted.190 If a prisoner knows that the acceptance of a pardon will mean
that she can no longer appeal her original conviction, the prisoner will be less
likely to accept the pardon or commuted sentence. The pardon should be an
avenue of justice that is encouraged and used to correct possible errors.191 For
example, one of the most common reasons that a governor issues a pardon is
due to doubt about the original conviction.192 If this is the case, and a court
holds that the Judiciary no longer has jurisdiction over a pardoned sentence,
an individual could get into a lose-lose situation: If the prisoner accepts the
pardon, the original conviction will never be overturned because the
Judiciary does not have jurisdiction, but if the prisoner does not accept the
pardon, he relies on the system that already convicted him once to overturn
his conviction. Both of these results are negative; yet still, the prisoner is
arguably more likely to not accept the pardon because the original conviction
will be forever cemented on his record. In contrast, if the courts still had
jurisdiction over the original conviction, the prisoner could accept the
190
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pardon and know that, should more evidence be introduced, there is still a
chance he could challenge the original conviction and sentence. Therefore,
in order to avoid discouraging individuals from seeking pardons, the courts
should hold that the Judiciary still retains jurisdiction over the original
conviction.
E.

The Executive Branch Will be Overburdened if it is Required to
Analyze the Original Convictions of Pardoned Individuals or Those
with Commuted Sentences.

If courts find the Executive Branch obtains jurisdiction over pardoned or
commuted sentences, the Executive Branch will be overburdened and unable
to effectively and fairly examine and grant pardons or commuted sentences.
The process for evaluating a pardon request is lengthy. First, the Pardon
Attorney must review and investigate an application.193 After this is
completed, the Pardon Attorney drafts his recommendation and sends it to
the Deputy Attorney General.194 The Deputy Attorney General reviews the
case and drafts the Department of Justice’s final recommendation.195 This
recommendation is then sent to the White House for review by the
President.196 The President may then decide whether to grant or deny the
request.197 This long process is coupled with a large number of petition
requests. For example, as of January 2020, the White House for fiscal year
2020 had 2,445 petitions pending.198 The lengthy process and high number of
applications show that the Executive Branch is susceptible to being
overburdened by pardon requests.
The Office of the Pardon Attorney’s request form for a pardon exemplifies
the Executive’s concerns of being overburdened by pardon requests. This
form requires prisoners to be finished with the appeals process of their cases
before submitting a request for a commutation.199 If this requirement was not
in place, prisoners could submit multiple requests after each different court
decision and overwhelm the system; therefore, the Office of the Pardon
Attorney requires the appeals process to be finished before a request for a
commuted sentence is submitted. This worry will be realized if courts find
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the Executive Branch retains jurisdiction over pardoned or commuted
sentences because any prisoners with commuted or pardoned sentences that
want to challenge their original conviction will be required to submit a new
request to the Executive.
The continual evaluation of conditional commuted sentences would also
overwhelm the Executive Branch if courts were to find the Judicial Branch
does not retain jurisdiction over pardoned or commuted sentences. The
Executive Branch would be required to monitor every conditional
commutation issued by the Executive. If a prisoner violated the condition
placed on the commuted sentence, the Executive Branch would be required
to reinstate a new sentence. Further, if a prisoner challenged his original
conviction after receiving a pardon or commutation, the Executive Branch
would be forced to re-evaluate the original conviction and sentencing. Not
only is this a violation of the separation of powers as previously described,
but the Executive Branch is not equipped to hear all of these cases.200 The
Executive Branch would be unable to handle all of the requests, and prisoners
would be left without a means of seeking justice. This would also discourage
Executives from issuing pardons because they will know that their
departments cannot continue to monitor and evaluate the original
convictions and sentencings. Therefore, the pardon—an act of mercy meant
to soften the harshness of the law201—would be discouraged and no longer a
means of seeking justice.
F.

Decreasing the Effectiveness of the Power to Pardon Risks
Undermining the Public Interest in Maintaining Public Order.

Alexander Hamilton argued the power to pardon was important because
it could be used to maintain public order.202 In the Federalist Papers, he used
the example of pardoning rebels in order to maintain peace in the country.203
Indeed, President Gerald Ford used this argument when justifying his pardon
of President Nixon.204 While that instance involved one individual person,
often time this pardon can be used to pardon many individuals; for example,
President Jimmy Carter pardoned Vietnam draft dodgers as a response to
public opinion opposing the Vietnam War.205 If the courts find the Judicial
Branch does not retain jurisdiction over the conviction of pardoned or
200
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commuted sentences, the Executive will be less likely to use this tool in order
to maintain public order and unite the nation.
For example, if the President issued a pardon to a large group of the
population that was convicted of treason (most likely through a rebellion),
the Executive would then have jurisdiction over all of the original convictions
of that segment of the population. If one individual was falsely convicted of
treason, or if that individual was not given a fair trial, the individual would
understandably want to challenge the original conviction so as not to
continue on with the conviction on record. If the courts held that the
Executive Branch has jurisdiction over the original conviction, the Executive
Branch would have to try the original conviction. However, if the Judicial
Branch retains jurisdiction over the conviction of pardoned or commuted
sentences, these individuals could plead their case in the courts throughout
the country. This would prevent the overburdening of the Executive Branch
with these requests, and the Executive would not be discouraged from issuing
pardons in order to maintain public order.
G.

Allowing Those Who Have Received Pardons to Challenge Their
Original Convictions in Court Grants Them a Better Opportunity of
Regaining Lost Rights and Privileges.

When an individual is convicted of a felony, he loses certain rights; i.e., the
right to bear arms, the right to sit on a jury, the right to vote, the right to hold
elected office, etc.206 A pardon will allow a person to regain these rights;
however, the conviction and pardon are both placed on the individual’s
criminal record.207 Therefore, while the individual may enjoy these rights, he
still may face trouble with licenses, bonds, and employment because of the
conviction on his record.208 Therefore, individuals who have received
pardons must be allowed to challenge their original convictions in court.
Again, a pardon mitigates the sentence, but it does not remove the
conviction.209 Rather, if individuals can challenge their original convictions
in the courts, they have a chance of overturning their conviction and
removing the stain of a conviction from their record.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts must find that the Judicial Branch retains jurisdiction over the
original conviction of pardoned and commuted sentences. The structure of
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the U.S. Constitution supports keeping the conviction of pardoned sentences
under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Branch because the nature of executive
power and the judicial power in their respective branches support this
conclusion. Public policy also supports keeping the conviction of pardoned
sentences under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Branch. Taking commuted or
pardoned sentences out of the jurisdiction of the Judicial Branch will result
in injustice. Specifically, those convicted for non-violent drug offenses and
those given the death-penalty will suffer under this holding. Moreover,
individuals will be discouraged from seeking pardons, and the Executive
Branch will be overburdened if it is required to analyze the original
convictions of pardoned or commuted sentences. Finally, the existence of
conditional commuted sentences shows the Judicial Branch must retain
jurisdiction over the conviction of pardoned or commuted sentences. For
these reasons, appellate courts must find the Judicial Branch retains
jurisdiction over pardoned or commuted sentences.

